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Google, Charlottesville, and the Need 
to Protect Private Employees’ Political 
Speech 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider that you are the owner of a popular hot dog 
eatery in Berkeley, California. One day in early August, after a 
long day of sausage sales, you return home and turn on the news, 
only to see the face of one of your employees participating in a 
white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.1 The next 
day, a popular Twitter account releases a photo of your 
employee, mentioning your restaurant, and calling on you to 
terminate the employee. You find yourself in a tough position. 
On one hand, you are in charge of a private entity (the hot dog 
restaurant), with a reputation and legitimate business interests 
that could suffer due to your continued employment of a known 
neo-Nazi. On the other hand, you are a steadfast supporter of 
free speech, and have serious doubts about allowing a Twitter 
account to dictate your employee’s right to assert his or her 
sociopolitical views off the clock, while maintaining a job. After 
all, you know that if you were a government agency, firing this 
employee would probably be a violation of his or her First 
Amendment rights.2 So what are private employers to do? 
 
 1 This hypothetical is inspired by the effects of a Twitter account that became 
widely known for tweeting photos of people who attended the “Unite the Right” rally or 
Charlottesville rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The Twitter account ultimately gained 
traction and led to the firing or resignation (this context is disputed) of a rally attendee 
named Cole White from Top Dog Restaurant in Berkeley, California. See James 
Wilkinson & Hannah Parry, White Nationalist is ‘Fired from his Job’ as Twitter Names 
and Shames Far-Right Thugs at ‘Unite the Right’ Charlottesville Rally that Led to 
Protester’s Death, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 14, 2017, 2:21 AM EDT), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4786826/Nationalist-FIRED-Twitter-names-shames-
protesters.html [https://perma.cc/MH2K-VYRZ]; Veronica Rocha, Cole White, Man 
Photographed at White Supremacist Rally, Is Out of a Job at Berkeley Hot Dog Eatery, 
L. A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-cole-
white-berkeley-top-dog-job-20170814-story.html [https://perma.cc/3A2K-3AAA]; @Yes
YoureRacist, TWITTER (Aug. 12, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://twitter.com/YesYoureRacist/
status/896423173914230784 [https://perma.cc/3ZYX-BBZB]; see also infra Section III.B. 
 2 Steven J. Mulroy & Amy H. Moorman, Raising the Floor of Company 
Conduct: Deriving Public Policy from the Constitution in an Employment-at-Will Arena, 
41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 945 (2014); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 
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The First Amendment’s free speech provision applies only 
against government employers, and not against nongovernmental, 
or private, employers.3 While the Supreme Court has laid out the 
limits to political free speech for government employees,4 there is 
no such federal standard for the political speech of private 
employees.5 The actions taken by private employers are still subject 
to certain federal statutes, namely bans on discrimination based on 
race, sex, national origin, and others.6 In this regard, the federal 
government prohibits private employers from firing or retaliating 
against employees based on their membership in certain protected 
classes.7 Federal law does not, however, ban private employers 
from discriminating against employees on the basis of their 
political affiliation.8 Instead, the risk of private employees being 
fired or retaliated against based on their political views or activities 
is dependent on the statutory or common law of the state in which 
they are employed.9 
A substantial minority of states have statutes that 
generally protect private employees from discrimination based 
on their political views.10 These prohibitive statutes vary greatly 
in language and application. For example, in California, 
employers are banned from discriminating based on “political 
activity,” which includes “ideological advocacy generally and not 
just election-related [activities].”11 This statute is similar to ones 
enacted in other states, including in West Virginia and South 
 
62, 75 (1990) (holding that “[p]romotions, transfers, and recalls . . . based on political 
affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights 
of public employees”). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Eugene Volokh, Can Private Employers Fire 
Employees for Going to a White Supremacist Rally?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
OPINION (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2017/08/16/can-private-employers-fire-employees-for-going-to-a-white-supremacist-
rally/?utm_term=.a33081c522f9 [https://perma.cc/EW59-9ENH] [hereinafter Volokh, 
White Supremacist Rally]. 
 4 See, e.g. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 62; see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–
19 (1980) (holding that public employment cannot be conditioned on an employee’s 
political beliefs, except in certain circumstances where the “private political beliefs would 
interfere with the discharge of [the employee’s] public duties”). 
 5 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3. 
 6 Id.; see also e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 241,(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)); Equal Pay Act 
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012))). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 8 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3. 
 9 See Mark T. Carroll, Note, Protecting Private Employees’ Freedom of Political 
Speech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 41 (1981); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2018). 
 10 Eugene Volokh, Private Employee’s Speech and Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012) [hereinafter 
Volokh, Statutory Protections]; see also Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 986. 
 11 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3; see also CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 1101 (West 2018). 
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Carolina.12 In New York, on the other hand, employers are banned 
from firing employees based on “recreational activities” as well as 
“political activities.”13 Although most employment within the 
United States is “at-will,”14 statutes such as the ones in California, 
West Virginia, South Carolina, New York, as well as other states, 
have been put in place to prevent private employees from being 
fired based on political activity.15 
These state statutes are especially relevant in recent times, 
as political and ideological activities are increasingly public.16 In 
the aftermath of the white nationalist march in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, civil rights advocates have taken to social media to spread 
photos and information about rally participants.17 In some cases, 
social media posts about participants’ information and employers 
have been revealed, leading to white nationalists being fired from 
their places of employment.18 When answering the question, “[c]an 
private employers fire employees for going to a white supremacist 
rally?”, Eugene Volokh of the Volokh Conspiracy says that it 
“depend[s] on the state [in which] the employee is employed.”19 
This issue is also exemplified in the recent situation 
where Google fired a male software engineer, James Damore, 
 
 12 See Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3; see also W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 3-8-11(b) (West 2018) (enacted 1915) (making it a misdemeanor for any employer 
or agent of an employer to “give any notice or information to his employees, containing 
any threat, either express or implied, intended or calculated to influence the political 
view[s] or actions of the . . . employees”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 (2011) (enacted 
1950) (making it “unlawful for a person to . . . discharge a citizen from 
employment . . . because of political opinions or the exercise of political rights and 
privileges guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
or by the Constitution and laws of this State”). 
 13 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d 
(McKinney 2018) (enacted 1992) (defining “recreational activities” as “any lawful, leisure-
time activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally 
engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, 
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material”). 
 14 Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the 
Employment At-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 
223, 224–28 (2017) (“The at-will rule creates a presumption that the employee can be 
terminated without cause—or, as many courts have framed it, ‘for any reason, or no 
reason at all.’”(footnote omitted)); see also Section I.A. 
 15 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3. 
 16 See Bodie, supra note 14, at 266. 
 17 Stacey Rose Harris & Noor Chughtai, Impact of the Charlottesville Protests 
on Virginia Employers, 29 No. 8 VA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2017). 
 18 See Aaron Aupperlee, Western Pa. Company Fires Man Who Attended 
Charlottesville Rally, TRIB LIVE (Aug. 28, 2017, 5:33 PM), http://triblive.com/local/
allegheny/12670026-74/western-pa-company-fires-man-who-attended-charlottesville-
rally [https://perma.cc/L32A-SE44]. 
 19 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3. The Volokh Conspiracy is a 
part of the Washington Post, and is a blog written by law professors and legal scholars on 
various issues of law and public policy. Eugene Volokh, Editorial Independence, WASH. 
POST:VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/about/?utm_term=.7fd542199463 [https://perma.cc/929W-Q7HM]. 
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who posted a memo challenging some of Google’s diversity 
efforts, “such as mentoring programs open only to people of a 
certain race or gender.”20 The memo contained provocative 
statements about differences between men and women, citing 
studies that women are more prone to neuroticism, and that 
women on average show “a [higher] interest in people rather 
than [in] things,” while men are the opposite.21 The memo 
challenges the design and focus of Google’s diversity initiatives 
and calls on Google to recognize inherent differences between 
populations.22 Damore denounces Google’s “politically correct 
monoculture.”23 Damore has hired civil rights attorney, Harmeet 
Dhillon, regarding a pending lawsuit against Google,24 and 
Dhillon’s website calls for employees to speak out about Google’s 
“discriminat[ing] against employees on the basis of their political 
views.”25 Because California is a state in which employers are 
banned from punishing employees based on political speech,26 
could Google face liability for firing Damore?27 These examples 
emphasize the need to create a uniform regulation across states; 
a regulation that has legitimacy and accountability sufficient to 
protect private employees’ freedom of political speech against 
their employer’s discrimination. 
 
 20 Dan Eaton, Why it May Be Illegal for Google to Punish that Engineer Over 
His Now Viral Anti-Diversity Memo, CNBC (Aug. 7, 2017, 4:01 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/07/it-may-be-illegal-for-google-to-punish-engineer-over-
anti-diversity-memo-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/PD3C-C2QW]; see also Matt 
Young, Republican Lawyer Harmeet Dhillon Hired by Google Engineer James Damore to 
Fight Discrimination Case, NEWS.COM.AU (Aug. 30, 2017, 1:02 PM), http://
www.news.com.au/technology/online/censorship/republican-lawyer-harmeet-dhillon-
hired-by-google-engineer-james-damore-to-fight-discrimination-case/news-story/dcea
ebf1172d097cd954b602e1da206d [https://perma.cc/DFJ8-MZAP]. 
 21 Eaton, supra note 20; see also Kate Conger, Exclusive: Here’s The Full 10-
Page Anti-Diversity Screed Circulating Internally at Google, GIZMODO (Aug. 6, 2017, 
8:00 AM), https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2017/08/exclusive-heres-the-full-10-page-anti-
diversity-screed-circulating-internally-at-google/ [https://perma.cc/7TK3-VPMT]. 
 22 See Eaton, supra note 20. 
 23 Young, supra note 20. 
 24 Julia Carrie Wong, James Damore Sues Google, Alleging Intolerance of White 
Male Conservatives, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2018, 18:10 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/jan/08/james-damore-sues-google-discrimination-white-male-conservatives 
[https://perma.cc/F5UP-PAGL] (“The lawsuit claims that numerous Google managers 
maintained ‘blacklists’ of conservative employees with whom they refused to work . . . . and 
that Google’s firing[ ]  of Damore . . . [was] discriminatory.”); see also Young, supra note 20. 
 25 Have You Experienced Illegal Employment Practices at Google?, DHILLON LAW 
GROUP, (Aug. 22, 2017) https://www.dhillonlaw.com/blog/news/have-you-experienced-
illegal-employment-practices-at-google/ [https://perma.cc/8XTY-F6H2] (asking that any 
Google employee who has been discriminated against for their political views or has “[b]een 
written up for ‘un-Googly’ conduct” come forward and join Damore’s litigation). 
 26 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 2018) (“No employer shall . . . attempt to 
coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of discharge . . . to adopt 
or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political 
action or political activity.”). 
 27 See Eaton, supra note 20. 
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This note will therefore call for greater consistency among 
states regarding private employers’ and employees’ speech, which 
will take the form of a federal statute to be passed under 
Congress’s commerce powers.28 In Part I, this note examines 
federal and various state statutes that protect private employees’ 
political speech, as well as consider practical problems with the 
statutes’ scope and interpretation. Next, Part II of this note 
addresses arguments on both sides of the political speech debate. 
On one hand, the expansion of political speech protections for 
employees may put at risk private employers’ legitimate interests 
in choosing what type of person to employ. Alternatively, deeply 
rooted democratic values may provide reasons to expand 
protections. Part III of this note considers two modern case 
studies that reflect the contentious aspects of this debate. Finally, 
Part IV considers some alternatives, and ultimately advocates for 
a federal statute that can be passed under Congress’s regulatory 
interstate commerce powers. The statute will explicitly lay out the 
type of political speech that is protected, will allow employees to 
take civil action against discriminatory employers, and will also 
balance competing interests by containing exceptions and 
defenses available to certain employers. 
I. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES’ 
POLITICAL SPEECH 
A. The Trouble with “At-Will” Employment 
After considering the difficulties of a private employer 
who is being affected by the undesirable political views of an 
employee, now place yourself in the position of an employee, who 
is being affected by the political views of his or her private 
employer.29 For example, think of an employer that mandates all 
employees to support a certain candidate by attending rallies 
and signing petitions in support.30 If an employee did not want 
to perform these political activities, and in turn lost his or her 
job, what remedies could this employee seek? Again, “if the 
employer [here] were a government agency,” the answer would 
be that the employer has “violate[d] the employees’ free speech 
rights under the First Amendment.”31 If the employer were a 
private entity, but in a state with statutory protections for 
employees’ freedom of political speech, the law would afford the 
 
 28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 29 See Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 945. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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employee some remedy.32 In most states, however, the private 
employee would be out of luck.33 
For over a century, the prevailing rule has been that 
private sector employment is “at-will,”34 simply meaning that, 
unless a statute or contract provides otherwise, an employment 
relationship “can be terminated at any time for any reason.”35 
This can be thought of as a “mutuality of obligation,” since an 
employee retains the ability to quit at any point, and an employer 
is able to discharge at any point.36 In the past, unions protected 
private employees from “speech-related terminations” by 
negotiating contracts that laid out specific, performance-related 
termination requirements.37 Now that union membership has 
declined and “the vast majority of . . . workers . . . are ‘employ[ed] 
at-will,’” private employees have been left largely unprotected 
from speech-related firings.38 
As a common law rule, courts do not often stray from the 
rigidity of at-will employment.39 Although courts have sometimes 
upheld suits by employees on the ground of public policy, it is 
more typical that courts refuse to recognize limits to the rule.40 
For example, 
an employee who claimed he was discharged because he would neither 
vote for certain candidates in a city election nor coerce his family to 
do so was told by an appellate court that he was not entitled to 
damages even though the jury below had found he was wrongfully 
discharged.41 
Courts often “rely on [the] lack of mutuality of obligation” present 
in at-will employment in their reasoning—emphasizing that 
because the employee was not contractually bound for a definitive 
time period, the employer also could not be bound, and was 
 
 32 Id. at 946. 
 33 Id. For many private employees, the worry that they may be fired or warned 
for having political views that differ from their employers’ views is grounded in reality. 
A recent study released by Harvard University states that where workers received their 
employers’ political messages, 20 percent of those employers accompanied those 
messages with at least one warning of “job loss, plant closure, or changes in wages and 
hours.” Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, How Employers Recruit Their Workers into 
Politics—And Why Political Scientists Should Care, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 410, 414 (2016). 
 34 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 946. 
 35 Carroll, supra note 9, at 39. 
 36 Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time 
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484–85 (1976). 
 37 Jeannette Cox, A Chill Around the Water Cooler: First Amendment in the 
Workplace, 15 No. 2 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 12, 12–13 (2015). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Summers, supra note 36, at 487. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. (citing Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)). 
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therefore free to discharge the employee at any time.42 On the other 
hand, there are scholars that remain hopeful about the “public 
policy exceptions” to at-will employment that certain courts have 
articulated43 because these exceptions could potentially be used to 
vindicate the constitutional right to free speech.44 Such scholars 
have highlighted that private employers’ freedom of political 
speech is tied to the public conscience and must be protected, and 
therefore decide that courts should apply a common law “public 
policy exception” based on clear public policy.45 Needless to say, 
those who question the bounds of at-will employment have 
considered both public-policy based and statutory limits. 
B. Federal Protection for Private Employee Political Speech 
When considering the current state of statutory limits to at-
will employment, specifically the limits that hold private employers 
accountable for taking adverse action against employees based on 
their off-duty political activities, one could first turn to federal law. 
“No federal statute explicitly protects employees’ political speech 
from interference by private employers,” but a federal statute that 
could be interpreted as providing some protection to private 
employees’ speech is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).46 
While this statute protects certain types of employee speech, the 
federal law “does not apply to . . . employees [who are] not acting to 
secure a group benefit.”47 
Section 7 of the NLRA gives private employees “the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations . . . and to engage in . . . concerted activities for 
 
 42 Id. at 489; see also Bell, 75 S.W.2d at 613. 
 43 See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 514–17 (Or. 1975) (awarding compensatory 
damages to an employee who was fired because of her jury duty service, and discussing 
instances “in which the employer’s reason or motive for discharging harms or interferes 
with an important interest of the community and, therefore, justifies compensation to the 
employee”); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27–28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959) (finding that the firing of an employee because of his refusal to commit perjury was 
contrary to public policy, showed a lack of good faith on the part of the employer, and was 
thus wrongful); Frampton v. Cent. Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E. 2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) 
(holding that a “[r]etaliatory discharge for filing a workmen’s compensation claim is a 
wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law”). 
 44 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 946, 950. 
 45 Id. at 988. 
 46 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 499 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)); Carroll, supra note 9, at 48. 
 47 Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE 
L. J. 522, 526 (1982) [hereinafter Yale, Free Speech]; see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB., 437 
U.S. 556, 564–65 (1978) (the Act, in part, “was intended to protect employees when they 
engage in otherwise proper concerted activities in support of employees of employers 
other than their own,” and it has long been “held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ 
clause encompasses such activity”). 
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the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”48 “Mutual aid and 
protection” covers an employee’s ability to participate in strikes, 
protests, and also “advocacy unrelated to traditional union 
activity.”49 The NLRA therefore offers private employees some 
First Amendment protections.50 In interpreting this section, the 
Supreme Court has protected employee activity and held that the 
“mutual aid or protection” clause is not limited to specific disputes 
between an employee and the employer, but can also cover 
methods for improving employment conditions “through channels 
outside the immediate employer-employee relationship.”51 While 
the Court has sometimes broadly covered employee speech 
under Section 7, other decisions have narrowed this 
interpretation, requiring that political speech also bear a close 
relationship to the economic interests of employees in the scope 
of their employment.52 The Supreme Court in Eastex Inc. v. 
NLRB, for example, discussed limits to employee speech 
protections, stating that there could be instances in which the 
relationship between employee speech or activities is so 
attenuated that it “cannot fairly be deemed to come within the 
‘mutual aid or protection’ clause.”53 The Supreme Court did not 
elaborate further, leaving it to the National Labor Relations 
Board to “determine the outer boundaries of the clause’s 
coverage.”54 As a whole, under Supreme Court precedent, these 
protections are relatively limited, as the NLRA only protects 
private employee political speech as far as it closely “relat[es] to 
the terms and conditions of employment.”55 As it turns out, “the 
more political the [private employees’] speech . . . the less likely 
[federal] labor law is to protect it” in a comprehensive and 
inclusive way.56 
 
 48 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)). 
 49 Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public 
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. 
L. REV. 921, 922 (1992). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Carroll, supra note 9, at 50 (citing Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565). 
 52 Id. at 51–52. 
 53 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567–68. 
 54 Rachel Simon, Comment, Workers on the March: Work Stoppages, Public 
Rallies, and the National Labor Relations Act, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (2007) 
(citing Eastex, 437 U.S. at 568). 
 55 Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815, 842 
(1996) (footnote omitted). 
 56 Id. 
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C. State Protection for Private Employee Political Speech 
About half of the country’s population lives in states that 
generally prohibit employers from punishing employees based 
on their political speech or activities.57 While some of these 
jurisdictions have statutes that more generally protect employee 
free speech, others more specifically protect employee speech on 
political matters.58 Further, some of these political free speech 
jurisdictions protect only certain types of political activities, “such 
as endorsing or campaigning for a party, signing an initiative or 
referendum petition, or giving a political contribution.”59 So, while 
ranging from general to specific in their definitions of “political 
speech,” these statutes are meant to shield private employees 
from being fired or retaliated against based on certain political 
viewpoints and activities.60 Similar to a protected trait in the 
federal or state civil rights laws, these state statutes protect 
certain characteristics (employees’ political opinions), and the 
activities that go along with them.61 
Legal scholars have pointed out various practical 
problems with these types of statutes.62 Firstly, statutory 
challenges rarely ever lead to a “final decision[ ]  in court.”63 One 
reason for this is that, “since the statutes give no civil remedies to 
employees, the most interested parties in such cases have no 
recourse in the courts, and provide no source of litigated cases.”64 
Almost all of the statutory protections allow for only criminal 
sanctions, which consist of small fines or imprisonment of the 
employer’s agents.65 Although courts generally treat the criminal 
sanctions as also generating a civil tort action,66 “the imposition 
of a small fine” on employers alone does not sufficiently remedy 
the employees who are retaliated against.67 Further, 
“prosecutors generally seem to lack enthusiasm for initiating 
cases under the statutes: there are few reported prosecutions of 
 
 57 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 297. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. For example, statutes in California, Colorado, Guam, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, West Virginia, Seattle 
(Washington), and Madison (Wisconsin) “bar employers from retaliating against 
employees for engaging in political activities.” Id. at 313–18. 
 60 Carroll, supra note 9, at 58. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. at 59; Summers, supra note 36, at 495. 
 63 Carroll, supra note 9, at 59. 
 64 Id. (citing Summers, supra note 36, at 495). 
 65 Id. (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 1978)). 
 66 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 302. 
 67 Carroll, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 
(Ill. 1978)). 
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employers for coercing their employees,” or otherwise interfering 
with employee political speech.68 
Even in states such as California and Louisiana, that do 
offer civil remedies for employees whose employers have interfered 
with their political opinions, there is still an underwhelming 
amount of litigation brought under the statutes:69 
The lack of litigation and the accompanying lack of court decisions 
under the statutes seriously inhibit the statutes’ usefulness to 
employees: without litigation and the resulting judicial clarifications 
of the statutes, employees do not know what statutory protections 
they can assert, what defenses are open to employers, or what level of 
coercive intent on the part of employers is necessary for an employee 
to recover damages.70 
The second practical problem within this area of law is 
that even in states with broadly worded statutes, under which 
many activities could constitute political speech, state courts have 
failed to specifically apply the statutes in ways that provide 
effective protection for private employees.71 For example, 
although states such as Louisiana and South Carolina have 
statutes that prevent private employees from being fired or 
retaliated against based on their political opinions,72 some district 
courts have chosen to narrowly define what constitutes “political 
speech.” In South Carolina, the statute’s protection is limited to 
matters that are “directly related to the executive, legislative, and 
administrative branches of Government, such as political party 
affiliation, political campaign contributions, and the right to 
vote.”73 In a narrowing of the statute’s application, the United 
States District Court for the District of South Carolina held that 
an employee’s display of a Confederate flag was not considered 
“political speech,” although the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit later opined that the display could 
constitute an exercise of political rights.74 Courts in Louisiana 
have also continuously denied relief under their political speech 
protection statute, often asserting that the plaintiff and 
 
 68 Id. (citing Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1928)). 
 69 Id. at 60. Colorado, Delaware, and Puerto Rico also “statutorily provide civil 
remedies for politically coerced employees.” Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 62. 
 72 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (2011) (enacted 1938); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-
560 (2011) (enacted 1950). 
 73 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 313, (quoting Vanderhoff v. 
John Deere Consumer Prods., Inc., No. C.A. 3:02-0685-22, 2003 WL 23691107, at *2 
(D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 74 Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 254, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d 
on other grounds, 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
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defendant did not meet the requisite “employment relationship” 
under the statute, given that the plaintiff was an uncontracted 
“deputy” or “appointee” of the defendant, rather than an 
employee.75 Even in a case in which an employee was able to 
recover from his employer after being discharged for his political 
views, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana relied primarily on other grounds, noting their 
reluctance to apply the Louisiana employee political speech 
protection statute, in part because “no court has apparently ever 
cited or construed it since its passage in 1938.”76 
Virginia, the site of the recent Unite the Right Rally in 
Charlottesville,77 currently has no such statute. Virginia instead 
“strongly adheres to the doctrine of at-will employment.”78 
Virginia’s legislative history, however, reveals that around the 
time of the passage of both Louisiana and South Carolina’s 
political speech laws, a similar law was proposed in Virginia.79 
The discussion of these statutes in the Reconstruction-era South 
was brought on by a “Republican concern that southern 
employers were pressuring their employees to vote against the 
Republicans.”80 On December 9, 1867, framers of the Constitution 
of the State of Virginia passionately discussed the “suffering 
condition” of many Virginia employees, who reported that they 
were fired because of exercising their right to vote for the 
Republican Party.81 The language used throughout the heated 
debate aligns with common arguments for and against 
protecting private employees’ political speech, stating: 
Here are hundreds and thousands of men in the State who say they 
are willing to work, who are ready to work, who are begging for work, 
and there is work to be done. But, in consequence of political 
prejudices . . . these men are turned out of employment. Yet the very 
men who need the labor . . . who have the capital to bestow for labor, 
 
 75 Boyer v. St. Amant, 364 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 365 
So. 2d 1108 (La. 1978); Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 565 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (La. Ct. App. 
1990). Although these cases involved public employees, they exemplify the stringent 
standard of recovery under the Louisiana statute. 
 76 McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295, 302 (M.D. La. 1979), rev’d, 646 
F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981) (involving a public employee alleging that he was fired from his 
job for purely political reasons). 
 77 Richard Fausset & Alan Feuer, Far-Right Groups Surge Into National View 
in Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/far-
right-groups-blaze-into-national-view-in-charlottesville.html [https://perma.cc/Z6ZN-ND3E]. 
 78 Harris & Chughtai, supra note 17. 
 79 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 301 n.19., (citing DAVID 
LLOYD PULLIAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE 
FOUNDATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO THE PRESENT TIME 134 (1901)). 
 80 Id. at 300. 
 81 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 33, 43 (Richmond, New Nation 1868). 
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those are the men who, in consequence of political prejudices, have 
turned these poor people out . . . 82 
Proponents of a resolution therefore argued that it be made a 
misdemeanor for any employer to discharge an employee on the 
basis of his political opinion.83 Those who opposed the proposition 
argued that it would result in despotism, which would “break up 
and destroy all transactions and business relations existing 
between man and man—to strike at the very cornerstone of society 
itself.”84 Despite the supporters’ continued arguments that it is 
“harsh[ ]  and vindictive[ ] ” for employers to fire employees because 
they do not vote a certain way,85 the proposal was defeated and no 
such statute was enacted.86 
Taken together, private employees across the United 
States are either left unprotected against their employers’ 
potential political speech discrimination or are subject to varied 
and inconsistent forms of state protection. California, for 
example, has a broad statute, which defines “political activities” 
as meaning “[more] than just partisan or electoral activities.”87 
California’s statute for employees’ freedom of political speech 
states, “[n]o employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, 
regulation, or policy: (a) Forbidding or preventing employees from 
engaging or participating in politics or from becoming candidates 
for public office. (b) Controlling or directing, or tending to control 
or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees.”88 
California’s Supreme Court has articulated that political 
activities cover more than just party matters, and instead cover 
any speech or “activities involving the ‘espousal of a candidate or 
cause,’” which therefore includes employees’ “participa[tion] 
in . . . social movements such as the gay rights movement.”89 
Following this decision, a federal district court similarly 
construed “‘political activities’ to cover the holding of certain 
views on drug and alcohol policy.”90 
While these decisions seem to widen the interpretation of 
California’s statute, they are a departure from previous 
 
 82 Id. at 44. 
 83 Id. at 46. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 44. 
 86 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 301 n.19., (citing DAVID 
LLOYD PULLIAM, supra note 79, at 134). 
 87 Id. at 313. 
 88 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (2018). 
 89 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 313 (citing Gay Law 
Students Ass’n. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979)). 
 90 Id., (citing Thompson v. Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp., No. C-94-4015 
MHP, 1996 WL 162990, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996)). 
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applications.91 For example, the California Supreme Court 
previously narrowly construed “political speech,” finding that an 
employee could be legally fired “simply for being a Communist.”92 
Though the broad language of the California law arguably comes 
closest to protecting employees’ political speech, it is unclear 
whether this broad interpretation will continue, or whether 
California courts will revert to previous interpretations of political 
speech.93 The unpredictability and inconsistency of these state 
protections, or lack thereof, point to the need for a uniform 
regulation across the United States—so that private employees are 
not subjected to varying degrees of free speech restrictions across 
state lines. 
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXPANSION OF 
POLITICAL SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
There are certainly valid arguments that employers should 
be free to dissociate from employees whose views they find 
objectionable. Employers have legitimate business interests to 
prioritize, and their business’s success should not be at the whim of 
an employee with radical or distasteful political opinions. In the 
same vein, Volokh states in his summary of the employee-protective 
state statutes, “[p]erhaps such statutes should not be copied by other 
states, and perhaps they should even be repealed, which is what 
happened in 1929 when Ohio repealed its ‘political activities’ 
statute.”94 On the other hand, the most basic reasons to strengthen 
the freedom of political speech become more and more relevant: 
For tens of millions of persons who are genuinely dependent on private 
employers—dependent in the sense that they simply cannot afford to 
lose their current jobs—freedom of political speech can be exercised 
only subject to the forbearance of their employers. As economic power 
becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of large corporations, 
citizens’ dependence on private employers grows and so does the 
insecurity of free political speech.95 
There are strong public policy interests in protecting political free 
speech for private employees. Many Americans “spend about one-
third of their lives” at work, and communication between 
coworkers in the workplace is considered vital to both democratic 
 
 91 Carroll, supra note 9, at 60–62. 
 92 Id. at 62; see also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
Cty., 171 P.2d 21, 24 (1946). 
 93 Carroll, supra note 9, at 62. 
 94 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 301. 
 95 Carroll, supra note 9, at 36. 
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society and “individual self-fulfillment.”96 This self-expression 
argument is powerful given the value that the United States places 
on being a country of diverse populations and ideas.97 Of course, 
there are imposed limits on free speech that are integral to a 
functional society, and protecting this sort of employee speech 
might place too heavy a burden on the employer.98 The question 
remains whether to continue imposing these limits on free speech 
in the private workplace, even though the speech in question is 
political and carries meaningful weight in a democratic system. 
A. Arguments Against the Expansion of Employee Political 
Speech Protections 
The most compelling argument against the expansion of 
political speech protection in the private workplace involves the 
employer’s freedom of expression and First Amendment rights.99 
The government may encroach on First Amendment rights when 
it “forces a party to tolerate [statements or activities] which a 
reasonable listener would attribute to her.”100 In short, 
employers do have the right to dissociate “from unwanted 
attribution to them of ideological messages.”101 This attribution, 
however, is only likely to happen in cases that involve the speech 
of high-ranking employees and other employees who are thought 
of as spokespersons of the entity, during both work hours and 
while outside of work.102 Although the employees in question 
here would not necessarily be thought of as “spokespeople” for 
Google or a California hot dog eatery, it is possible that social 
media and the publicity of the employees’ speech has caused 
some level of attribution to their private employers, such that 
these entities sought to release themselves from the appearance 
of attribution by firing the employees.103 
 
 96 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 989. 
 97 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 225, 225, 236 (2013) (arguing that employment law is justified in protecting 
employees’ privacy and political speech, in the interests of social equality, “even if it 
imposes meaningful costs on employers”). 
 98 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 538. 
 99 Id. at 537. 
 100 Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977); West Va. Bd. Of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id.; see also Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1976) (finding that 
the First Amendment did not prevent a public employee who held a policymaking office 
from being fired based on expressions made against the policy goals of the governor); cf. 
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 578 (7th Cir. 1972) (where the 
First Amendment prevented a non-policymaking state official from being fired solely for 
his refusal to transfer his political allegiance from one party to another). 
 103 See discussion infra Part III. 
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Beyond ordinary attribution, if the employer itself is a 
“representative organization,” then its free speech rights are 
thought of as “proxies for the expressive and associational rights 
of its members.”104 For example, “[a]n eco-friendly energy 
company should be able to decide to hire only ‘green’ employees 
and to terminate the employee who denies the existence of 
human-induced climate change.”105 The private institutions to be 
discussed in this note, however, cannot be thought of as political 
or ideological associations, because they “exist[ ]  primarily for 
economic purposes.”106 These entities do not exist solely “to 
disseminate an ideological message.”107 They will therefore not 
endure substantial harm to their associational rights as a result 
of expanded protections of employee speech.108 
Another argument against the expansion of political 
speech protection in the private workplace involves the 
employer’s property interests.109 These property interests 
revolve around the employer’s right to protect and maintain 
their own businesses and not be subject to the government’s 
impairment of their financial success.110 Under the Supreme 
Court’s precedent, such property protection interests not only 
apply to individual or smaller-scale employers but also extend 
equally to corporations.111 An employer’s financial success could 
be put in danger if the employer is forced to retain an employee 
who reduces sales or harms the business’s reputation in some 
way.112 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution forbid the government from taking private 
property for public use “without just compensation.”113 If the 
federal government were to protect employee speech at work, it 
could be interfering with the employer’s interest in determining how 
 
 104 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 538 (footnote omitted); see also NAACP 
v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458–62 (1958) (discussing that in 
certain associational groups, members have such a “nexus” that allows them to act as 
representatives of the organization) (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may 
in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, 
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”). 
 105 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 980. 
 106 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 538. 
 107 Id. at 539. 
 108 Id. at 538. 
 109 See id. at 533. 
 110 See id. at 534. 
 111 See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations 
Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank 
v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L. J. 1347, 1362 (1979). 
 112 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 535. 
 113 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. 
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (where the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment was applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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the employer’s property is being used, the employer’s ability to 
exclude others from his or her property, and the employer’s interest 
in the value of the property.114 If these “[t]hree . . . ‘sticks’ [in] the 
‘bundle’” of interests were “substantially impair[ed]”, then protecting 
employee speech could arguably create an unlawful taking.115 
Whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred 
depends on the aggregate effect of government action, so any 
statute that seeks to protect employee speech should take into 
“consider[ation] any loss of property value to the employer 
resulting from the speech.”116 The loss in value, or expected loss, 
to a private entity as a result of the imposed speech protections 
alone would not likely constitute a takings claim.117 Even 
considering that the employee protection could constitute a 
taking, the protection would clearly satisfy the takings clause 
requirement that the government taking be for a public purpose 
or public good.118 Here, that public good is freedom of political 
speech, directly relating to the public welfare and society as a 
whole.119 It is unclear in what way employers could be justly 
compensated for such a taking under the Fifth Amendment,120 as 
employers would likely need to allege financial impairment, and 
thus recover their monetary loss based on the market value of 
their businesses at the time the taking took effect.121 
The final argument against the expansion of employee 
political speech protections stems from the previously 
mentioned associational right—the employer’s right to privacy 
and freedom from governmental intrusion.122 For employers that 
 
 114 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 533–34. 
 115 Id. at 533–34; see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 
(1980) (The examination of whether such speech could constitute a taking “entails 
inquiry into such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic 
impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (holding that the government’s attempt 
to create a public right of access to a private pond interfered with the pond owner’s 
reasonable investment-back expectations. “[T]he Government’s attempt to create a 
public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or 
improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking. . . .”). 
 116 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 534–35. 
 117 See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 59–60 (1936); see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 
83 (finding no support for the contention that the government’s allowance of petitioners 
on shopping center property would “unreasonably impair the value or use of their 
property as a shopping center”). 
 118 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 535; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 119 Id. 
 120 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 121 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015). 
 122 See id. at 540; cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, 
Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 63–65 (2000) (“The limits that freedom of 
association places on the antidiscrimination principle are understood to represent a 
judgment about the function of intimate and expressive associations in a diverse and 
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operate as small family businesses and the like, placing 
protections on employees’ speech could “intrude upon the 
constitutionally protected privacy of the individual, the home, 
and the family.”123 Legal scholars have noted the difficulty in 
determining which spaces are suitable forums to allow for 
freedom of speech, versus which spaces are too private for the 
government to regulate.124 Consider, for example, a situation in 
which the owners of a small shop are Holocaust survivors, or the 
children of Holocaust survivors. If the family were to find out 
that one of their cashiers wrote editorial articles in favor of the 
Nazi agenda, the employers should not be subject to the 
government’s protection of this employee’s job.125 Nevertheless, 
“[a]s a business begins to acquire more characteristics of a 
corporate bureaucracy and fewer of a family enterprise . . . the 
employer’s interest in privacy diminishes proportionally.”126 
Given these factors, the constitutional rights of employers, 
particularly the employers who will be most greatly affected by 
such employee speech protections, should be taken into 
consideration in any proposed statute. 
B. Arguments in Favor of the Expansion of Political Speech 
Protections 
Given the constitutional arguments against expanding 
political speech protections to private employees, compelling 
arguments must be made in order to explain the need for federal 
protection. A critical reason for this need is that free speech, 
particularly political speech, is increasingly under attack in 
everyday life.127 First Amendment law professor, Joel Gora, points 
to the “instantaneous condemnation and punishment of fraternity 
members for singing racially offensive lyrics at a social event, the 
 
democratic society. But the denial of associational freedom and the validation of the 
antidiscrimination principle in other institutions, particularly the workplace, effectively 
assigns to those institutions, and to the relations that form there, another sort of function 
that is equally important in a diverse democratic society.”). 
 123 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 540; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”). 
 124 See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment 
Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1537, 1567 (1998). 
 125 In-Person Conversation with Joel Gora, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law 
School, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2017). 
 126 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 540; see also Mulroy & Moorman, supra 
note 2, at 980 (“At least, in a small business setting, such an employer may have a free 
association interest in choosing the persons with whom he spends forty hours a week.”). 
 127 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First 
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 72 (2016). 
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brazen murder of journalists for producing anti-Muslim cartoons 
and commentary, or the cancelling of celebrity contracts for 
making offensive remarks or expressing unpopular views” as 
modern examples of suppressing or silencing free speech.128 This 
suppression is problematic because free speech holds an integral 
place in democratic societies.129 It goes towards members of society 
participating in decision-making, individual self-expression, and 
the overall pursuit of intellectual progress and change.130 
Many have recognized the intrinsic importance of free 
speech, not only for government entities and employees, but also 
for private employees.131 In cases where employee political 
speech is restricted, the employer has economic power over the 
employee, and wields that economic power in order to enhance 
his or her control over the political sphere.132 The fact that 
employers hold this economic power over employees is especially 
meaningful given the proliferation of at-will employment.133 In 
light of the decline of union membership, many employees lack 
the ability to bargain with their employers for protective 
termination requirements.134 On a fundamental level, this is 
threatening to the idea of social equality, the dynamics of which 
have political implications:135 “Workers, fearful of losing their 
jobs, will suppress their own political views or express views 
with which they do not agree. The result will be a skewed 
political discourse, in which employers’ voices are amplified and 
workers’ are squelched.”136 
As a result, the political discourse may lack the viewpoints 
of employees that could be “particularly distinctive and 
important.”137 Philosophers have stressed the importance of 
citizens seeing each other as political equals, and the importance 
 
 128 Id. at 72–73. 
 129 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 529; see also Nadine Strossen, Freedom 
of Speech and Equality: Do We Have to Choose?, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 185, 188 (2016) (noting 
that the “safe spaces” on college campuses “where students are shielded from ideas they 
consider offensive or hateful” are “opposite . . . the outlook” and responsibilities reflected 
in the First Amendment). 
 130 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 529. 
 131 See generally Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47 (arguing for greater federal 
protection of private employees’ freedom of speech); Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2 
(recommending that courts use a “public policy exception” to protect private employees’ 
freedom of speech); Carroll, supra note 9 (advocating for a modal statute or common-law 
rules that would protect private employees from “politically motivated firings”); 
Bagenstos, supra note 97 (using social equality theory to argue for government 
regulation of the private employment relationship). 
 132 Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 256. 
 133 See discussion supra notes 37–38. 
 134 See discussion supra notes 37–38. 
 135 Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 264. 
 136 Id. at 256. 
 137 Id. 
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of citizens aggregating their opinions when participating in 
politics, and in the epistemic search for a common good.138 
Strengthening these elements of the democratic system works to 
maintain the government’s authority and legitimacy.139 
In addition to losing out on the range of ideas that make 
up a complete political landscape, there are also serious concerns 
relating to employees as individuals140: 
We protect free speech not merely as a means of promoting discussion 
and participation in democratic government, and not merely to 
further the discovery of truth through “the marketplace of ideas,” but 
also because individual self-expression is good for its own sake. It 
leads to happier, more fulfilled lives: a better quality of life for the 
individuals doing the expressing, and because these individuals are 
more fulfilled, a more pleasant environment for the friends and 
coworkers around them.141 
In other words, not only does the suppression of employee political 
speech diminish the collective search for truth that is vital to a 
functional democracy, but it also has negative implications for the 
personal and social interactions that employees experience in their 
everyday lives.142 It is for these reasons that we must remember 
that private employees are also members of a democratic society—
a society that benefits from the expression of conflicting ideas. 
Furthermore, the advancement and expansion of 
technology has resulted in greater exposure of off-duty speech 
that has the potential to impact a person’s career or prospects.143 
Given “the phenomenon of ‘going viral,’ one slip of the tongue, 
caught on camera or recorder” has the ability to cause serious 
damage to people’s lives.144 This technology, among other forms 
 
 138 See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK 108 (Princeton U. Press ed., 2008) (advancing the idea of “epistemic 
proceduralism,” which expresses that democratic authority and legitimacy is rooted in 
people’s belief that the majority’s outcome was determined through a collective search 
for the truth, and further expresses that this epistemic quality gives individuals moral 
reasons to follow laws with which they disagree); see also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES, pt. 1 (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed., 1913) (“Born a citizen of 
a free state and member of the sovereign people, however feeble the influence of my voice 
in public affairs, the right to vote upon them imposes upon me the duty of instructing 
myself. Whenever I meditate upon governments I am happy to find in my investigations 
new reasons for loving that of my own country.”). 
 139 ESTLUND, supra note 138, at 108. (“The structure [of democratic theory] is 
similar to what we might naturally say about the authority of a jury’s verdict in a 
criminal trial: the jury system is designed with great attention to its epistemic value 
(among other things). When a jury reaches a verdict, its legitimacy and authority do not 
depend on its correctness, but they do depend on the epistemic value of the procedure.”). 
 140 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 989. 
 141 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 142 See id. 
 143 See Gora, supra note 127, at 72. 
 144 Id. 
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of surveillance, can lead to the alarming effect of “suppress[ing] 
criticism of [the] government.”145 Scholars recognize that 
technological advances have directly impacted employment, by 
increasing the employer’s ability to discover personal information 
about the beliefs and opinions of their employees.146 In modern 
employment, employees’ personal reputations are increasingly 
public and “more easily [linked] to their employers, such that a 
drunken Friday night tirade or an offensive tweet can bring 
down the weight of thousands or even millions of social-media 
participants onto the person and their employer.”147 Therefore, 
employers are now amply armed with the “ability to coerce large 
numbers of employees’ beliefs and opinions.”148 Finally, it is not 
enough to say that employees who do not like their employer’s 
free speech restrictions can find another job, perhaps in a 
different state.149 “For most of these people, the prospect of losing 
their jobs is a significant hardship, and has a formidable chilling 
effect on their speech.”150 Therefore, because of the employer’s 
ability to coerce, and because of the value of freedom of political 
speech as a core ideal, there is a need to protect employee speech 
on the federal level. 
III. MODERN EXAMPLES OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES AND 
CONTENTIOUS POLITICAL SPEECH 
A. Google and James Damore’s Diversity Memo 
Analyzing various modern contexts in which this problem 
has emerged will shed light on both sides of the employee 
political speech argument and demonstrate the need for 
consistency in free speech protections. As previously mentioned, 
former Google employee, James Damore, was recently fired for 
posting a memo challenging Google’s diversity efforts.151 The ten-
page memo, entitled “Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber,” 
“argues that women are underrepresented in [the] tech [industry] 
not because [of] . . . bias, but [instead] because of 
inherent . . . differences between men and women.”152 Damore 
 
 145 Id. at 72–73. 
 146 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 528–29. 
 147 Bodie, supra note 14, at 266. 
 148 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 529. 
 149 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 989. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See discussion supra notes 20–27. 
 152 Conger, supra note 21. 
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posted the memo to one of Google’s internal message boards in 
August of 2017, and it subsequently went viral.153 
In the memo, Damore expresses his goal to “have an 
honest discussion” about “Google’s political bias,” which he 
asserts has resulted in the “silencing” of ideological 
differences.154 The memo goes on to discuss studies that detail 
the biological and personality differences between men and 
women, which result in women being less represented in the tech 
industry and in top leadership positions.155 He accuses Google of 
adhering to “several discriminatory practices,” in order “to 
achieve equal gender and race representation.”156 Damore lastly 
offers measures that Google could take in order to improve the 
company’s culture, which include de-moralizing diversity, 
stopping the alienation of conservatives, as well as reconsidering 
and limiting Google’s mandatory unconscious bias trainings.157 
Google later fired Damore for crossing the line by 
perpetuating gender stereotypes, which Google states “is contrary 
to [its] basic values,” as well as its Code of Conduct.158 While 
Damore’s memo includes problematic generalizations, it is worth 
noting that he also seems to be voicing concerns about a modern 
trend towards the suppression of speech.159 Thus, as the former 
employee has begun exploring legal remedies, it is interesting to 
consider whether Damore’s expression of ideological speech might 
be protected under either federal or state law. 
If Damore seeks to recover under section 7 of the NLRA, 
he would need to show that the distribution of his memo was a 
form of “concerted activity” that closely relates to his 
employment.160 Although “there is no evidence that 
Damore . . . was trying to organize a union[,] . . . he could argue 
that . . . [his call] for the inclusion of more diverse ideological 
viewpoints at Google[ ]  amounted to ‘concerted activities’ 
protected under the law.”161 In fact, Damore told the New York 
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Times that he has “a legal right to express [his] concerns about 
the terms and conditions of [his] working environment . . . which 
is what [his] document does.”162 Still, “Damore would [also] have 
to show that his memo was more than” simply his own 
commentary, and that he was calling on others to participate in 
a conversation about Google’s policies.163 Overall, Google seems 
to have fired Damore due to his controversial views about gender 
differences, and not due to his complaints about the company’s 
policies.164 Because those particular controversial comments 
seem to have an insufficient relationship to the terms and 
conditions of his employment, it seems that Damore’s federal 
law claim is not likely to succeed. 
Damore might have better luck pursuing recovery under 
California’s state statute.165 Under the broad reading of this 
statute, Damore’s views might constitute an “espousal of 
a . . . cause,” which includes an employee’s participation in social 
movements.166 The memo encourages ending a “politically correct 
monoculture that maintains its hold by shaming dissenters into 
silence.”167 Damore speaks directly to social structure and cultural 
change, thereby constituting the type of ideological advocacy 
California’s statute seeks to protect.168 While Damore’s memo 
proved to be controversial, the former employee would likely be 
able to make a showing that Google’s adverse action against him 
was in conflict with his state’s protection of political speech. On the 
other hand, one writer for the Washington Post called Damore a 
“hostile-workplace complaint waiting to happen,” because of his 
use of “insulting rhetoric and disregard for institutional norms.”169 
Because of this, she says, Damore is “a business liability,” one that 
the private company was within their rights to fire.170 
Nevertheless, if Damore was in fact fired for his views—even if they 
were a departure from institutional norms—then Google has taken 
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illegal adverse action against this employee on the basis of political 
speech, speech which the state of California voted to protect. 
B. Private Employers and Charlottesville Rally 
Participants 
On August 11, 2017, white supremacists and neo-Nazis 
assembled in Charlottesville, Virginia, to rally against the 
removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee.171 
Protestors “invoked Ku Klux Klan imagery and [reportedly] 
shouted, ‘Jews will not replace us’ and ‘white lives matter.’”172 In 
the chaos of white supremacists clashing with counter protestors, 
there were many injuries, and a woman was run over and killed 
by a car driven by a white supremacist rally participant.173 
Following the violence, people have taken to social media to urge 
employers to take action against white supremacists who 
attended the rally: 
Indeed, a Twitter account with the handle @yesyoureracist has sought 
help in identifying those who participated with the white nationalists 
in Charlottesville. With the assistance of its followers, 
@yesyoureracist has successfully pressured some employers—
including a restaurant in Berkeley, California—to fire employees 
based on their actions in Charlottesville, and it’s likely that other 
employers will come under similar public pressure.174 
An article published in the Virginia Employment Law Letter 
about the Charlottesville rally, or the “Unite the Right” rally,175 
points out that “Virginia strongly adheres to the doctrine of at-
will employment,” and that private employers are within their 
rights to fire employees for their participation in political 
protests.176 The article also suggests, however, that if employers 
are “truly interested in taking a moral stan[ce] against racism,” 
“a more productive response [might] be to reinforce in [the] 
workplace” the uniting values of tolerance and inclusion.177 This, 
it is argued, will bring us closer to achieving the “American ideal 
that all people are created equal.”178 It goes without saying that 
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white supremacist and neo-Nazi speech is both hateful and 
morally repugnant, but it is important to recognize that 
protecting even abhorrent political speech would serve to protect 
American democratic ideals. 
Although Virginia employees who attended the 
Charlottesville rally are left relatively unprotected, there is still the 
question of the employee from Berkeley, California, who was fired 
after his employer responded to tweets that identified him at the 
rally.179 The Twitter account posted a photo of the employee, Cole 
White, with a caption that notes his place of employment as Top 
Dog restaurant in Berkeley.180 A later post by the same account 
includes a message from Top Dog, in which they relay the news 
that they will no longer be employing Cole White.181 Cole White’s 
political activity, like that of James Damore, is arguably the type 
of ideological advocacy and participation in a social movement that 
the California state statute protects.182 Although Cole White may 
have a statutory claim against Top Dog, the impact of protecting 
political speech should also be taken into account here, where the 
company is a smaller employer. Revisiting this situation, 
specifically against the backdrop of arguments opposing the 
expansion of employee speech protection,183 will illuminate and 
resolve some real-world concerns. 
First, to address the issue of attribution,184 the political 
action of an employee was ultimately the reason for Top Dog’s 
overwhelming exposure into the Twitterverse.185 Proof that Top 
Dog felt the need to dissociate their restaurant from the 
ideological messages of Cole White came in the form of a sign on 
the restaurant’s door stating, “[e]ffective Saturday 12th August, 
Cole White no longer works at Top Dog. The actions of those in 
Charlottesville are not supported by Top Dog. We believe in 
individual freedom and voluntary association for everyone.”186 In 
short, Top Dog’s concerns about being closely associated with a 
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neo-Nazi may be legitimate, since social media users had 
successfully made the restaurant widely known as the employer 
of a person with undesirable political ideas.187 The fact remains, 
however, that Cole White’s actions were taken during off-work 
hours, off the premises of the restaurant, and in a different 
state.188 Despite the social media “naming and shaming,”189 it is 
unreasonable to think that an employee of a small hot dog 
restaurant acts as a spokesperson for the company whether on 
or off the job.190 
Although this social media attack on Cole White may be 
viewed as the unnecessary airing of his dirty laundry, others 
may view the exposing of Cole White as a warranted safety 
measure, necessary to protect the general public from neo-Nazi 
hate speech, which can be harmful and traumatic.191 The 
definition of “hate speech” differs in other countries, and in some 
countries Cole White’s participation in the neo-Nazi rally would 
be punishable by law.192 The United States Supreme Court, 
however, has a history of protecting even hateful forms of speech, 
denying First Amendment “shortcut[s]” and creating safeguards 
against the suppression of core political expression.193 And whereas 
hate speech is a protected form of speech under First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has not protected “fighting 
words”194 that incite “imminent lawless action”195 or words “which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace.”196 While much of the speech at the 
Charlottesville rally would likely fall under protected First 
Amendment speech, some argue that participants may have 
crossed into fighting words “when they began chanting racist 
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and homophobic slurs to specific people on the streets.”197 Given 
the unfortunate violence that ensued, there is an argument to be 
made that some participants were partaking in impermissible 
and unprotected incitement.198 Nevertheless, the facts made 
public about Cole White do no more than portray him as a 
participant in the Unite the Right Rally, and for the purposes of 
free speech analysis, it is useful to assume that he was there to 
voice his vile opinions, but likely not to cause violence. 
Still, to address another concern of those opposing the 
expansion of private employees’ free speech protections, any 
protection of an employee such as Cole White must also be 
balanced against the negative effect on the employers’ property 
interests, namely in maintaining their business. In considering 
this issue of an unlawful taking, it is notable that “complaints of 
lost potential profits . . . have [often] constituted weak takings 
claims.”199 Instead, “[t]he aggregate effect of a substantial loss of 
value, together with a partial loss of the right to exclude,” are 
the factors that could result in an unlawful taking.200 Without 
speculating as to the exact loss to Top Dog if they were to be 
statutorily compelled to continue employing Cole White, it is 
entirely possible that the result would be a substantial loss and 
an unreasonable burden on this small-sized restaurant. While 
the political speech that Cole White took part in is the type of 
speech that the federal government should protect, it is also 
important for any solution to this issue to take into consideration 
and to adjust for any substantial burden on the smaller, less 
“Googly”201 employers. 
IV. SOLUTION: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL PROTECTION 
To regulate protection for private employees, Congress 
should enact a statute to be passed under its broad interstate 
commerce powers.202 The statute’s substance should reflect the 
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idea that employers should be prevented from taking adverse 
action against employees on the basis of their political affiliations 
or actions, which they express while off-duty, while allowing 
“exceptions for particularly small companies, the highest-level 
managers, and a confined class of individuals hired specifically to 
engage in political speech on behalf of the employer.”203 The type 
of speech, employees’ remedies, and employers’ defenses and 
exceptions should be laid out in a way that echoes this main 
purpose and accounts for a balancing of interests.204 
Before discussing the statute’s content, it is worth 
addressing why the state statutory scheme is insufficient to stand 
up to the realities of a modern and integrated society. Consider 
two different employees at a political event in New York over a 
weekend. One, a California employee, cannot be fired for their 
speech because of a state statute.205 The other, a Virginia 
employee, can be fired for the same conduct, and has no statutory 
protection. Although these people stood at the same event, 
holding the same signs and chanting the same words, they 
experience different results that have real and tangible impacts 
on their lives. Despite where one falls on the political spectrum, it 
is of the utmost importance to recognize the value of political 
participation by members of all states and of ending the 
suppression of political speech in our everyday lives.206 Ending the 
suppression begins with imposing a consistent and effective 
federal statute that prohibits employers from taking adverse 
action against employees on the basis of their political views. 
A. The Type of Speech to be Protected 
Under the case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.,207 the Supreme Court upheld the passage of the NLRA 
because of Congress’s power to reach activities that place 
burdens on interstate activity.208 Under this decision, Congress 
has the power to regulate “the organized activities of private 
employees [in order to] promote industrial peace and . . . protect 
interstate commerce.”209 There, the Court found that recognizing 
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the right of employees to self-organize would be “an essential 
condition of industrial peace,” as it would reduce labor 
disturbances and refusals by employers and employees to confer 
and negotiate.210 In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court 
decided that Congress’s protections under this clause did not 
need to be exclusively in the realm of transactions that were in 
the “flow of interstate . . . commerce.”211 Instead, the “[b]urdens 
and obstructions [that Congress regulates] may be due to 
injurious action springing from other sources.”212 Here, the 
protection of private employees’ freedom of political speech could 
remedy state law inconsistencies, and prevent employees from 
relocating to different states due to a lack of protection by their 
state laws, or due to their need to find a new place of employment 
after their employers take action against them. As modern 
technology brings about the increased exposure of private 
employees’ off-work political speech, there may be a similar 
increase in the amount of people moving from one state to 
another, and potentially disrupting the commercial landscape. 
Further, Google, and other tech-giants of the country213 have 
impacts far beyond the states in which they are headquartered, 
and thus their policies have the potential to manipulate labor 
trends across the country, by favoring employees whose speech 
is “acceptable,” and silencing factions of dissenting employees. 
The proposed statute would therefore be close in function 
to section 7 of the NLRA, as it would prohibit employers from 
taking adverse action against employees on the basis of certain 
protected speech.214 Instead of the NLRA’s protection of employee 
speech that relates to concerted activities and the terms and 
conditions of employment, this statute would protect employee 
speech that involves their “political views, expressions, 
affiliations, or activities.”215 The statute makes it illegal to 
threaten, terminate, suspend, or discipline an employee when 
that action is taken in order to coerce or retaliate against an 
employee on the basis of this political speech.216 Here, political 
speech should be cast in a light similar to the interpretation 
under California law. Political views should encompass not only 
party politics, but also ideological advocacy, along with the 
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“espousal of a candidate or a cause.”217 To ensure that the courts 
are not left to such discretionary interpretation, what 
constitutes “political” speech should be explicitly defined in the 
statute, as “having to do with issues, ideas, arguments, 
ideologies, or positions that deal with broad social policy choices, 
the organization, conduct, and powers of government, and 
similar matters of concern to the general public.”218 Both James 
Damore’s memo and Cole White’s rally attendance would satisfy 
this definition of political speech.219 
B. The Available Remedies 
The current state statutes that protect employee speech 
do not provide adequate civil remedies for employees.220 
Therefore, the proposed statute would allow for employees to 
take civil action against their employers.221 Under the statute, 
the employee could recover both actual damages and punitive 
damages, and if the employee prefers, he or she could “seek 
reinstatement with back pay in lieu of punitive damages.”222 The 
possibility for employees to seek recourse would adequately hold 
employers accountable, and serve to remedy employees for any 
adverse employment action taken against them on the basis of 
their political speech. 
C. Employer Exceptions and Defenses 
The passage of a statute as far-reaching as this could be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny by the courts, and therefore 
certain exceptions must be made in order to withstand judicial 
scrutiny and protect the interests of smaller companies.223 In 
order for Congress to use their regulatory commerce powers, the 
regulated activity must be shown to harm interstate 
commerce.224 Here, “politically coercive or politically motivated 
actions by employers against employees could be shown” to be 
the relevant harm to interstate commerce.225 For some private 
entities like Google, it is clear that any of the company’s 
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“objectionable employment practices”226 would have effects on 
interstate commerce that are well within Congress’s authority. 
Companies like Google, Apple, and Facebook are “tech giants,” 
whose power over society’s interactions is “closer to that of 
governments than of mere corporations.”227 It is not as clear, 
however, to see the effects that smaller, private entities have on 
interstate commerce—and for those entities, it is not as clear 
whether Congress has the authority to regulate them. 
In order to avoid this constitutional scrutiny, and to 
simultaneously avoid substantially impairing the interests of 
smaller entities,228 the statute will allow for a “floor,” that 
dictates the types of businesses that are subject to the statute.229 
The floor will be determined by the entity’s gross income, the 
number of employees the entity employs, and any other financial 
considerations that Congress deems appropriate. The goal of the 
floor will be to exempt private entities that are smaller, more 
intimately connected in the workplace, and less like larger 
“corporate bureaucrac[ies].”230 If the business is small and falls 
below the floor set in place, then it is exempt. This scheme is 
similar to the Mrs. Murphy exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 
under which landlords who own “dwellings intended to be 
occupied by four or fewer families” are exempted from certain 
housing discrimination prohibitions.231 In the case of Mrs. 
Murphy, the exemption arguably “guards her First Amendment 
right not to associate.”232 Here, those same associational rights 
are secured for the exempted small businesses, who are free to 
fire employees on any basis. This quells the worries brought up 
in the earlier hypothetical about the possible responsibilities of 
a small shop owned by Holocaust survivors or their children.233 
Despite overcoming these worries, the exemption allows 
people like Mrs. Murphy to discriminate, and therefore allows for 
the infringement of the other party’s right to be free from 
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discrimination.234 Here too, the statutory floor does allow for some 
private employees to be discharged or disciplined due to their 
political speech, and for some employers to take what would be 
otherwise prohibited action. This is a conflict of rights that is 
inevitable given the complexities of the rights at stake. By 
allowing exemptions for smaller businesses, the statute 
safeguards certain private entities against substantial 
impairment to the value of their businesses and substantial 
interference to their associational rights. Furthermore, the 
statutory floor also addresses the attribution problem, since the 
smaller the business, the more likely the speech of employees will 
be attributed to the employer. 
In the interest of further safeguarding against the 
substantial impairment to the value of businesses, to which even 
larger businesses are susceptible, the statute would also provide 
a substantial injury defense to employers.235 The defense would 
allow employers to claim that the employee’s political speech “(a) 
substantially injured the employer’s ability to produce his goods 
or services, or (b) caused the loss of a substantial amount of 
business from customers or suppliers, or (c) created a reasonable 
likelihood of the immediate occurrence of the events specified in 
the sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.”236 If the employer 
proves “any . . . of these defenses by a preponderance of the 
evidence,” then the employer is released of liability and the 
adverse employment action is justified.237 While it would likely 
be difficult for a tech giant like Google238 to meet the 
requirements of the substantial injury defense, it might be 
reasonable for a restaurant chain like Top Dog to assert this 
defense, especially given the social media traction and publicity 
of their employees’ speech.239 Ultimately, the statute’s exceptions 
and defenses serve to avoid any constitutional problems that 
could arise from placing too heavy a burden on the employer. 
D. Proposed Legislation 
This note proposes that Congress pass a federal statute, 
aimed at protecting private employees from being harmed because 
of their political beliefs and activities. The legislation should be 
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titled “The Statutory Protection of Every Employee from 
Constitutional Harm (SPEECH) Act,” and will read as follows: 
 
The Statutory Protection of Every Employee from 
Constitutional Harm (SPEECH) Act 
SECTION 1. PREVENTING ADVERSE ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYEES 
DUE TO THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
In the interest of employment uniformity, interstate 
commerce, and industrial peace, no employer shall . . . 
(a) make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy 
forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating 
in politics or from becoming candidates for public office, 
(b) adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy 
which will control or direct the political activities or affiliations 
of employees, 
(c) or coerce or influence, or attempt to coerce or 
influence employees through or by means of threat or discharge 
to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any 
particular course or line of political action or political activity. 
SECTION 2. DEFINING “POLITICAL ACTIVITIES” 
“Political activities” in Section 1 shall include . . . 
(a) speech that involves employees’ political views, 
expressions, affiliations, or activities, 
(b) the espousal of a candidate or cause, 
(c) or any speech having to do with issues, ideas, 
arguments, ideologies, or positions that deal with broad social policy 
choices, the organization, conduct, and powers of government, and 
similar matters of concern to the general public. 
SECTION 3. CIVIL ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYERS 
The employee can recover actual damages and, if he or 
she has been dismissed, can additionally seek to receive either 
punitive damages or reinstatement. 
SECTION 4. EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENSES 
Nothing in Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this statute shall apply 
to employers 
(a) who employ less than [a prescribed number of] 
employees [to be determined by Congress], 
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(b) whose business’s gross income is less than [a 
prescribed dollar amount, to be determined by Congress], 
(c) whose business otherwise indicates an intimately 
connected workplace, such that an employer proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his or her associational 
interests would be unreasonably impaired by the employment of 
an individual with such political views, 
(d) whose business has been or will be substantially 
injured by the employee’s political speech, such that the 
employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employee has caused or that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the employee will cause a loss of a substantial amount of 
business from customers or suppliers, 
(e) whose business is a representative, political, or 
ideological organization, in which the employee holds a 
representative role, and whose speech, if attributed to the 
business, would directly threaten the business’s dissemination 
of an ideological message,240 
(f) who wish to take action against their business’s 
highest-level managers, or an otherwise restricted subset of 
employees hired with the express purpose of representing their 
employer’s political positions.241 
SECTION 5. CRIMINALLY IMPERMISSIBLE SPEECH 
Notwithstanding the above sections, employers may still 
choose to inquire into and take action against employees based on 
speech that is found to be criminally or otherwise impermissible. 
 
* * * 
 
Providing for exceptions that factor in employer 
interests, and leaving certain technical figures to Congress’s 
discretion, the SPEECH Act offers a balanced approach to 
protecting private employees’ freedom of political speech in a 
meaningful and necessary way. 
CONCLUSION 
“Indeed, unpopular speech is the type most in need of 
protection.”242 Even when the political speech is contrary to 
 
 240 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 78–80 (putting forth a similarly structured statute). 
 241 See Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 254. 
 242 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 549. 
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commonly held ideological views, the benefits of protecting private 
employees’ speech is in the best interest of both self-expression and 
American ideals of a participatory democracy. Although this note 
ultimately recognizes the need for federal protection, the 
arguments against this protection are not without merit and 
constitute compelling reasons to insert some balancing of interests 
into a statutory proposal. While James Damore’s former employer 
might be subject to liability under current California law, the result 
might be different in a state without such employee speech 
protections, one that adheres to the doctrine of at-will employment 
even in cases of political discrimination. Many of the private 
employee attendees of the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, for example, may be fired simply because of their political 
activity outside of work. The modern examples of particularly 
contentious political speech by private employees, and the possible 
remedies and consequences of their employers’ actions, highlight 
the need for a comprehensive, uniform statute protecting 
employees’ political speech. 
It is clear that the current system of political speech 
protections for private employees falls short of what is necessary to 
consistently protect the modern employee. As individuals 
experience the everyday realities of the “war on free speech,”243 
there is a greater need on the part of the government to step in and 
uplift political speech protections on the federal level. By doing so, 
the government would promote and strengthen free speech, and 
dismiss the idea that the type or amount of political speech private 
employees partake in while off-duty is conditioned on the approval 
of their employers. It is time to end the war on free speech in the 
workplace and protect American democracy. 
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